On the Problem of Evil: Why Passionate Atheism Doesn't Make Sense
Here is the famous Epicurean formulation of the problem of evil. P1: God exists. P2: God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. P2a: An omnipotent being has the power to prevent evil. P2b: An omniscient being knows that evil exists. P2c: An omnibenevolent would want to prevent evil. P3: Evil exists. These propositions are inconsistent. That is, at least one of these propositions must be false: either God does not exist, evil does not exist, or God is not omnipotent, omniscient, or omnibenevolent. More on P2. Given that evil exists, if God is omnipotent, he either does not know that evil exists (not omniscient) or does not want to prevent evil (not omnibenevolent); if God is omniscient, he either has no power to prevent evil (not omnipotent) or does not want to prevent evil (not omnibenevolent); if God is omnibenevolent, he either has no power to prevent evil (not omnipotent) or does not know that evil exists (omniscient). However,