Philosophical Sketches

This is the articulation of what it is for a statement (propositionally structured content) to be true within the framework of the D-Lewisian possible world semantics. A viable theory of truth must entail the T-Schema: “ P ” is true ↔ P . Here is the formalism of language. Formalism : Language is a function from sentences to meanings, i.e., a set of ordered pairs of sentences and meanings. L : language s : sentence L ( s ): the meaning of s L : {( s 1 , L ( s 1 )), ( s 2 , L ( s 2 )), …} W : possible world w : fact, state of affairs The meaning of a set of sentences is a possible world that serves as a specific model for the interpretation of the set. As Wittgenstein remarks, a world is a totality of all facts, or states of affairs. A theory is a function L that pairs one set of sentences with some model in a particular way. As such, a theory is a relation between two structures (sentences and world); although the relation can be surjective, I will focus on bijective relations for s

“There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy. All the rest—whether or not the world has three dimensions, whether the mind has nine or twelve categories—come afterwards. These are games; one must first answer.” – Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus === Every philosophical inquiry is born of some angst which stems from one’s confusion in facing a certain inconsistency of the world (whether it be the world of numbers, particles, matters, people, or spirits). If one is so bothered by the inconsistency to the point that he takes it to be his vocational duty to resolve the tension, philosophy is his calling. So, what is my angst? What form of inconsistency am I bothered with? Here is the origin of my Wertherian angst: 남자는 그가 사랑하는 이가 그를 무심하게 바라볼 때 , 시인이 되고 철학자가 된다 . [1] My psychotherapist once noted to me that I seem to tend to idealize romance in hop